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Abstract— Market-based coordination of demand side assets
has gained great interests in recent years. In spite of its
efficiency, there is a risk that the interaction between the
dynamic assets through the price signal could result in an
unstable closed-loop system. This may cause oscillating power
consumption profiles and high volatile energy price. This paper
proposes an electricity market model which explicitly considers
the heterogeneous dynamic asset models. We show that the
market dynamics can be modeled by a discrete nonlinear
system, and then derive analytical conditions to guarantee
the stability of the market via contraction analysis. These
conditions imply that the market stability can be guaranteed by
choosing bidding functions with relatively shallower slopes in
the linear region. Finally, numerical examples are provided to
demonstrate the application of the derived stability conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
To adapt to the distributed generation and increasing
penetration of volatile renewable energies and to improve
the overall efficiency of the power industry, the power
systems have undergone a substantial change from centrally
controlled, vertically integrated organizations to decentrally
controlled, deregulated systems. Market mechanism has been
introduced at various levels of power systems to create com-
petition. In particular, a local electricity market can be cre-
ated to motivate self-interested distributed energy resources
(DERs) to realize efficient energy allocation and achieve
system-level objectives. Several demonstration projects have
been implemented to validate the idea which showed promis-
ing practice. For example, the GridWise® demonstration
project by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory showed
that the market-based coordination of residential loads could
reduce the utility demand and congestion at key times [8].
The AEP Ohio demonstration project [1] further showed
the capability of enforcing both system-wide constraints
and local constraints, while optimizing both system and
individual objectives [28].
Motivated by these projects, recent studies have been
focused on the market mechanism design for engaging
different types of DERs [19], [11], [5], [18]. For example, the
authors in [19] proposed a market mechanism to coordinate
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a population of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) for
demand response. The proposed bidding strategies incorpo-
rated the TCL dynamics in order to improve the accuracy and
efficiency of the load coordination. For commercial HVACs
(heating, ventilation and air conditioning), a double-auction
market structure was designed which takes into account
the detailed nonlinear building models [11]. The proposed
market was demonstrated to be very efficient at peak shaving
and load shifting services. Other market models for demand
response using batteries or PEVs (plug-in electric vehicles)
were also proposed in [7], [18].
Despite the popularity of market-based coordination, there
has been a growing concern about the risk of the instability
of the power market. Under some extreme conditions, the
aggregate demand and the energy price can be unstable or
demonstrate high volatility over time. Various factors that
contribute to the instability of market-coordinated TCLs have
been examined in [24]. Some earlier works abstracted a sim-
ple linear differential equation model to quantify the power
market stability [3], [2], [25]. A discrete time nonlinear
model based on the marginal cost pricing mechanism was
proposed in [27]. It assumed that the demand side did not
bid into the market and its utility function was unknown to
the system operator. The focus was therefore on the market
instability caused by the uncertain demand prediction of the
coordinator. Under the same framework of [27], the authors
in [31] considered a more realistic dynamic consumption
model. It was obtained from solving an optimal inventory
control problem, and the market stability was found to be
related to the ratio between the marginal backlog disutility
and the marginal cost of supply.
The aforementioned works only considered aggregate
demand models in autoregression form depending on the
previous consumption history or price history [27], [31].
However, in order to quantify the aggregate demand variation
more accurately, the internal dynamics and operational limits
of individual DERs must be considered. More importantly,
the impact of the population dynamics of the DERs on the
overall market dynamics must be investigated systematically.
These features are nevertheless abstracted away in the exist-
ing literature.
In this paper, we propose a market model which explicitly
considers the individual dynamics of the DERs. Specifically,
we model each DER by a general constrained linear sys-
tem. Such models have been widely employed to describe
the dynamics of its internal energy state [12], [29], [30].
Moreover, we consider the bidding process of the DERs and
model the bidding functions to be dependent on the energy
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state. Consequently, the market is cleared at the competitive
equilibrium, which results in an efficient energy allocation
for each individual DERs. These features distinguish our
work from those by [31], [27]: the latter of which assumed
no bidding process and the price was ex-ante which may not
clear the market.
Under the proposed market structure with heterogeneous
dynamic DER models, we translate the analysis of the market
stability into the stability analysis of a closed-loop system of
the DER dynamics. In general, this system can be viewed
as a model predictive control (MPC) system [22], [10] or
systems with optimization based controller [13], [14], [26],
[17]. By assuming quadratic utility and cost functions, it
can be further shown to be a piecewise linear system [6].
Alternatively, it can be viewed as an input saturation system
with state-dependent saturation limits. Most of the existing
stability results considered only special cases of such sys-
tems [22], [13], [14], [26], [20], [15], [16], which are gen-
erally not applicable to the system considered in this paper.
In fact, even the analysis of these much simpler systems
are very challenging. While general numerical stability tests
via Lyapunov methods may be employed, they lend little
insights into the market practice. In addition, they are very
conservative and can become intractable as the number of
DERs increases.
To address the above challenges, we propose a contraction
analysis based approach to analyzing the stability of such
systems. This approach enables us to derive analytical con-
ditions that guarantee the market stability. These conditions
provide important insights into the design of the bidding
functions. The key observation is that the market stability can
be always guaranteed by selecting shallower bidding func-
tions, that is, the linear region of the bidding function should
have a relatively small slope. Moreover, these conditions are
very mild, and thus leave the full freedom to the individual
users to design their desired bidding functions while ensuring
a stable electricity market.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The market
structure and its equilibrium are described in Section II. The
characterization of the equilibrium and the stability results
are presented in Section III. Numerical examples illustrating
the application of the stability results is provided in Section
IV. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section IV.
Notation: We use 1m to represent the m dimensional
column vector of all ones, and Im the m dimensional identity
matrix. The index set {1, 2, ...,m} will be denoted by theM.
Let X be a subset of Rm, then for x ∈ Rm, the set X − x
is defined as {x′ − x, ∀x′ ∈ X}. For a symmetric matrix
S, the inequality S  0 (S  0 ) means that the matrix is
positive definite (positive semi-definite). We denote by HQ
with Q  0 the Hilbert space Rm with inner product 〈·, ·〉Q :
Rm × Rm 7→ R defined as 〈x, y〉Q := xTQy, and induced
norm ‖·‖Q : Rm 7→ R≥0 defined as ‖x‖Q :=
√
xTQx.
The Euclidean 2-norm will be denoted by ‖·‖2, The pro-
jection operator in HQ, denoted by ProjQC(x) : Rm 7→
C, is defined as ProjQC(x) := arg miny∈C ‖x− y‖Q =
arg miny∈C ‖x− y‖2Q. When Q = Im, we simply write
ProjC(x) which is the standard projection in Rm.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we will first describe an electricity market
model which involves the bidding and clearing processes at
each market period. The problem of market stability analysis
is then defined formally.
A. Market Structure
Usually a system coordinator is running an electricity
market to schedule and guide the power usage of m DERs.
We assume that the ith DER is modeled by the following
discrete time scalar linear system subject to both state and
input constraints,
x+i = aixi + di, (1)
where xi, x+i ∈ Xi represent the current and the successive
energy states of the DER, respectively, and di ∈ Di is its
power consumption. The state and input constraint sets will
be denoted by Xi = [xi, x¯i] and Di = [di, d¯i], respectively.
The constant ai ∈ (0, 1] represents the energy dissipation
rate. This model has been widely used to describe the power
flexibility of the HVAC systems (when a ∈ (0, 1)) or energy
storage (when a = 1), see for example, [12], [30], [29].
To ensure the controllability of the system (1), we impose
the following conditions
aixi + d¯i > xi, aix¯i + di < x¯i. (2)
Condition (2) guarantees that the DER can be controlled
into Xi with di ∈ Di.
Note that the demand of the DER is changing dynamically
with the current states. For example, the DER is less willing
to procure power if its energy state is close to the upper
bound. We assume that each DER submits a bid on the
desired power and price to the coordinator in order to meet
its own demand. Given the energy price, the demand of the
DER will be determined by the bidding function. The bidding
function of the DER can be considered as the solution of a
payoff maximization problem defined as follows,
maximize vi(di, xi)− λdi
subject to: (1), x+i ∈ Xi, di ∈ Di,
(3)
over di, where vi : R × R 7→ R is the consumer’s utility
function dependent on the current state xi, and λ is the
energy price.
Note that the optimal consumption d∗i (λ;xi) is solved only
when xi ∈ Xi. In reality, the DER may not start with a initial
condition that is in Xi, then we simply assume the following
consumption policy,
di =
{
d¯i, if xi < xi,
di, if xi > x¯i.
(4)
Then under this controllability condition (2), the system will
converge exponentially to X i from any initial state xi(0) ∈
R\Xi under (4). Therefore, without loss of generality we will
always assume that the initial state lies in Xi.
The bidding function d∗i (λ;xi) describes the price respon-
siveness of the DER’s demand, that is, the change of the
demand with respect to the price. As a general common
assumption, we assume that the utility function vi is a
concave function of di.
The coordinator procures energy from electricity providers
to meet the aggregate demand of the DERs. We assume that
there is associated a fixed cost function c : R 7→ R with the
providers to supply the energy. As usual, the cost function
c is assumed to be convex, increasing, and c˙(0) > 0. The
providers are reimbursed at price λ and therefore seeks to
maximize its profit by supplying
s∗(λ) = arg max
s
λs− c(s), (5)
amount of power. The function s∗(λ) describes the price
sensitivity of the power supply.
To clear the market, an aggregate demand curve is con-
structed by the coordinator from the submitted bidding func-
tions [19]. It is the inverse mapping of the aggregate demand∑
i∈M d
∗
i (λ;xi), which describes the marginal utility. The
supply curve is given by the optimality condition of (5),
which is λ = c˙(s), i.e., the marginal cost as a function of the
supply. Then the market is cleared at the intersection point
(λc, s
∗) of the demand curve and the supply curve, where
the aggregate demand equals the supply and the marginal
utility equals the marginal cost, see Fig. 1. This marginal
cost λc is usually referred to as the market clearing price.
The tuple {λc, s∗, d∗i ,∀i ∈ M} will be referred to as the
market equilibrium.
B. Market Stability
As discussed in the previous subsection, at each market
period, the DER consumes d∗i (λc;xi) amount of energy.
Then the DER dynamics become
x+i = aixi + d
∗
i (λc;xi), (6)
for all i ∈ M. As illustrated in Fig. 2, this is a closed-
loop system under the feedback of the market clearing
process. In particular, notice that the market clearing price
can also be viewed as a function of the energy states of the
DERs. As a result, the stability of this closed loop system
must be investigated carefully. Ideally, in the absence of
the external disturbances, such as variation of the electricity
cost, coordination signal change, and weather change, etc.,
the system (6) should converge to a steady state as fast as
possible. In the rest of this paper, we will establish conditions
under which (6) is exponentially stable, that is, there exist
an equilibrium x∗ ∈ X , M > 0, and ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that for
all initial condition x(0) ∈ Rm, ∀k ∈ Z+, we have
‖x(k)− x∗‖ ≤Mρk ‖x(0)− x∗‖ ,
where x(k) is the system states at the kth period. Conse-
quently, the inherent robustness of an exponentially stable
system can reduce the price and power consumption volatil-
ity. Hereafter we will refer to the market stability and the
stability of the closed loop system (6) interchangeably.
In the next section, we will first characterize the market
equilibrium at each market period. This enables us to charac-
terize the consumption profile d∗i (λc;xi) of the DERs. Based
on these characterizations, the stability of the closed-loop
system (6) is analyzed via contraction analysis.
III. STABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we will first define and characterize the
market equilibrium. We show that it can be solved from a
social welfare optimization problem. Under the assumption
of quadratic utility and cost functions, we explicitly charac-
terize (6) by a discrete nonlinear system. We further derive
analytical conditions which guarantee the stability of this
nonlinear system.
A. Competitive Equilibrium
The intersection point of the demand curve and the supply
curve represents an equilibrium of the market. A competitive
equilibrium of the above described electricity market is a
tuple {λ∗, s∗, d∗i ,∀i ∈M} such that
• d∗i maximizes the ith consumer’s payoff, that is, it is an
optimal solution to the problem (3), for i ∈M.
• s∗ maximize the profit of the supplier, that is, it is an
optimal solution to the problem (5).
• λ∗ clears the market, that is,
∑
i d
∗
i (λ
∗;xi) = c−1(λ∗).
From the discussion of the last section, it is clear that given
the current state of each DERs, their bids are determined,
and the market is cleared at a competitive equilibrium
depending on the DERs’ states. It is well known by the
welfare theorems that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto
efficient and every Pareto efficient allocation is attainable
by a competitive equilibrium. The following lemma shows
that any competitive equilibrium is efficient, that is, it is an
optimal solution to a social welfare maximization problem.
Lemma 1. The competitive equilibrium {λ∗, s∗, d∗i ,∀i ∈
M} of the electricity market is equivalent to the optimal
solution of the following social welfare optimization problem,
maximize
di,s
∑N
i=1 vi(di, xi)− c(s)
subject to: x+i = aixi + di,
x+i ∈ Xi, di ∈ Di, ∀i ∈M∑m
i=1 di = s,
(7)
where the market clearing price λ emerges as the Lagrangian
dual variable associated with the demand-supply balance
constraint (the last equality constraint in (7)).
The proof of the above lemma follows the standard ar-
gument by checking that the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT)
conditions of (7) is equivalent to that of (3) and (5), see for
example [11].
Note that the social welfare problem (7) has to be solved
at each market period after the update of the DERs’ energy
states. The DER dynamics (1) with the feedback of the
optimal solution d∗i , ∀i ∈M can be viewed as a one-horizon
model predictive control (MPC) system, or alternatively, as a
system with optimization-based controller [26], [13], [14]. It
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Fig. 3: Bidding function in (9)
is well known that such systems could be unstable even when
the open loop systems are stable [21]. Although various ana-
lytical conditions are proposed in the literature to guarantee
the closed-loop stability of the MPC control system [22],
they are generally not applicable to the system considered in
this paper involving the market clearing process (7). In fact,
even the numerical verification of the closed-loop stability (6)
with quadratic vi and c can be very challenge [26], [13],
[14]. These works usually assume the knowledge of the
equilibrium, which is usually the origin. In addition, the
numerical conditions proposed there do not scale with the
number of the DERs in the market. In the next subsection,
we will work with the quadratic utility and cost functions
and obtain simple analytical conditions to guarantee the
closed-loop system stability and hence the market stability.
These conditions will provide valuable insight into market
dynamics as well as guidance on the design of the bidding
functions.
B. Closed-loop DER Dynamics
We assume that the utility function vi is a general
quadratic function of the power consumption di,
vi(di, xi) = −1
2
qid
2
i + (rixi + ci)di, ∀i ∈M, (8)
where qi > 0, ri, ci ∈ R are user-specified parameters
reflecting their preferences. Such quadratic utility functions
have been widely used in coordinating demand-side electric
loads via mean-field game approaches, see for example [9]
and the references therein. As discussed in the previous
section, the bidding function of the ith consumer is given by
the optimal solution of (3). It can be easily verified that it is
the projection of the optimizer of the unconstrained problem
onto the constrain set, which is
d∗i (λ) = Proj(Xi−aixi)∩Di
[−λ+ rixi + ci
qi
]
, (9)
where the non-emptiness of (Xi − aixi) ∩ Di is guaranteed
by the controllability condition (2).
A typical bidding function of the form (9) is depicted in
Fig. 3. It contains a linear region in-between the saturated
regions. In the figure, there are two threshold prices denoted
by λ1th and λ
2
th . Similar bidding function has also been con-
sidered in [19]. Note that the dependence on the load’s state
models the time-varying power demand of the consumer.
The cost function is assumed to be
c(s) =
1
2
β1s
2 + β2s, (10)
where βi > 0, i = 1, 2. Then the market price which is given
by the marginal cost is λ = β1s+ β2.
Using (8) and (10), we rewrite the social welfare prob-
lem (7) in vector form as follows,
maximize
d,s
− 12dTQd+ dT (Rx+ c)− 12β1s2 − β2s
subject to: x+ = Ax+ d, x+ ∈ X , d ∈ D,
1Tmd = s,
(11)
where d, x, c ∈ Rm and their ith components are di, xi, ci,
respectively. The diagonal matrices A, Q, R are generated
by the vector a = {ai}, q = {qi}, and r = {ri} respectively.
The state and input constraints are defined by X = Πmi=1Xi,
D = Πmi=1Di.
Without the inequality constraints, the optimal solution
to (11), which we shall refer to as the unconstrained maxi-
mizer, can be easily obtained as
dˆ(x) = Q˜−1(Rx+ c˜), (12)
where Q˜ = Q+β11m1Tm and c˜ = c−β21m. The constrained
optimal solution can be expressed using dˆ(x) conveniently,
which is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The optimal solution to (11) is given by
d∗(x) = ProjQ˜(X−Ax)∩Ddˆ(x). (13)
Proof. It follows the standard proof as those in for exam-
ple [9, Lemma 4]. 
Note that the feedback policy (13) is nonlinear due to the
projection. Overall, the closed-loop system becomes
x+ = Ax+ d∗(x). (14)
In particular, it can be shown that (14) is a piecewise linear
system [6]. We first observe that the existence of an equi-
librium of (14) is simply guaranteed by the controllability
condition (2).
Proposition 1. The closed-loop system (14) has an equilib-
rium x∗ ∈ X if the controllability condition (2) holds.
Proof. The equilibria of x+ = Ax+d satisfy (I−A)x = d.
Set x+ = x in (11), and replace s with 1Tmd = 1
T
m(I−A)x. It
can be seen that the convex quadratic programming (possibly
degenerated) has a solution if the constraints are non-empty,
and the latter can be found to be exactly the controllability
condition (2). 
Remark 1. Note that we can further pose conditions to
guarantee the uniqueness of the solution to (11) based on the
KKT conditions. This is particularly for the degenerated case
where the quadratic term is not strongly convex. However, we
will not complicate the discussion here, since our stability
results in the sequel will guarantee the uniqueness of the
equilibrium.
We will investigate the market stability through analyzing
the stability of the discrete nonlinear system (14). Specif-
ically, we will find conditions on the utility and the cost
functions such that (14) is exponentially stable. In particular,
this will guarantee no limit cycle exists. This is desired since
the limit cycle corresponds to the oscillation of the power
consumption and the high volatility of the market clearing
price. Denote by x+ = T (x) the discrete time nonlinear
dynamics (14). If we can show that T is a contraction
mapping on X , then it immediately suggests that there exists
a unique equilibrium in X such that it is exponentially stable.
In the case of ai ∈ (0, 1), the globally exponential stability
can be concluded in view of the policy (4). Next, we will first
consider the single DER case, and then extend the results to
the multiple DER case.
C. Single DER
This scenario arises frequently when an aggregate DER
model is obtained by the coordinator to facilitate the power
planning, see for example [27], [29], [30], [12]. Such a
model represents the aggregate power flexibility of the DER
population. It has the same form of (1) but with aggregate
power consumption as its input, and has much larger state
and input constraint sets. For clarity, we will denote by
(scalar) a the system matrix A in this section. First, we have
the following characterization of the mapping T .
Lemma 3. Consider the market consisting of one aggregate
DER model with m = 1. Then the nonlinear mapping T of
the closed-loop system dynamics (14) is given by
ProjX
[
ax+ ProjD
[
dˆ(x)
]]
, (15)
where dˆ(x) is defined in (12).
Proof. First note that for scalar Q˜ = q + β1 > 0, it is easy
to verify that ProjQ˜(X−ax)∩D is equivalent to Proj(X−ax)∩D,
i.e., the projection in the Rm. Then we need to show that
for arbitrary d, the following holds.
ax+ Proj(X−ax)∩Dd = ProjX [ax+ ProjDd] . (16)
If ax+ProjDd ∈ X , then ProjDd ∈ X−ax, and ProjDd =
Proj(X−ax)∩Dd. Hence, the above equality holds. Otherwise,
if ax + ProjDd /∈ X , we assume without loss of generality
that ax + ProjDd > x¯. Then the right hand side of (16)
is x¯. Since ProjDd > x¯ − ax, we have Proj(X−ax)∩Dd =
x¯− ax, and therefore the left hand side is also x¯. Thus we
proved (16) and also (15). 
Under the help of Lemma 3, we have the following
theorem for the market stability.
Theorem 1. Consider the power market consisting of only
one DER (m = 1) and suppose a ∈ (0, 1], q, β1 > 0, r ∈ R.
Then the closed-loop system (14) is exponentially stable in
X if the following condition holds∣∣∣∣a+ rq + β1
∣∣∣∣ < 1. (17)
Proof. By Lemma 3, the operator T =
ProjX
[
ax+ ProjDdˆ(x)
]
, where dˆ(x) = rx/(q + β1) + c˜.
Without loss of generality, assume x > y. We then discuss
the two cases r ≥ 0 and r < 0.
Case 1: r ≥ 0. Then x > y implies dˆ(x) ≥ dˆ(y) and
it follows that ProjDdˆ(x) ≥ ProjDdˆ(y), ax + ProjDdˆ(x) ≥
ay + ProjDdˆ(y), and T (x) ≥ T (y). Therefore,
|T (x)− T (y)| = T (x)− T (y)
≤ a(x− y) + ProjDdˆ(x)− ProjDdˆ(y)
≤ a(x− y) + dˆ(x)− dˆ(y)
= (a+
r
q + β1
)(x− y)
< x− y,
where the first and second inequalities are by the non-
expansive property of the projection operation [4, Propo-
sition 4.8], and the last inequality is by condition (17).
Case 2: r < 0. Then x > y implies dˆ(x) < dˆ(y) and it
follows that ProjDdˆ(x) ≤ ProjDdˆ(y). Therefore,
|T (x)− T (y)| =
∣∣∣a(x− y) + ProjDdˆ(x)− ProjDdˆ(y)∣∣∣
≤ max
{
ProjDdˆ(y)− ProjDdˆ(x) + a(y − x),
a(x− y)
}
≤ max
{
dˆ(y)− dˆ(x) + a(y − x), a(x− y)
}
= max
{
−a− r
q + β1
, a
}
(x− y)
< x− y,
where the second inequality used the non-expansive property
of the projection operation, and the last inequality is by
condition (17). Combing these two cases, we see that T is
a contraction mapping on X . Hence, there exists a unique
equilibrium in X which is exponentially stable. Thus we
showed that the system is exponentially stable in X under
condition (17). 
Remark 2. The condition (17) is exact the sufficient and
necessary stability condition for the unconstrained closed
loop system,
x+ = Ax+ dˆ(x).
However, it is not necessary for the constrained closed-
loop system (14). It is easy to give examples for which the
systems do not satisfy (17) but are still globally exponential
stable (with equilibrium on the boundary point). Also note
that for the energy storage DER with a = 1 (i.e., no energy
dissipation), the coupling coefficient r must be negative.
D. Multiple DERs
For the case of multiple DERs, the situation is much more
complicated than the single DER case. The difficulty mainly
stems from the weighted projection ProjQ˜(X−Ax)∩Ddˆ(x)
(see (13)). Even though the projection set (X − Ax) ∩ D
is decoupled in Rm, the projection of dˆ(x) are coupled
among each components since Q˜  0 is not diagonal.
This reflects the fact that the optimal power consumption
of each DER will depend on those of other DERs. Clearly,
this is a result of the interaction between DERs through
the market coordination. Due to this coupling, we do not
have the characterization of T as in (15). However, when
the number of DERs is large, they become weakly coupled.
In fact, from the unconstrained maximizer dˆ(x) we have by
the Sherman–Morrison formula [23] that
dˆ(x) = Q˜−1(Rx+ c˜)
=
(
Im − β1Q
−11m1Tm
1 + β1
∑m
i=1 q
−1
i
)
Q−1(Rx+ c˜)
= Q−1Rx− β1Q
−11m
1 + β1w1
xa + co,
where xa =
∑
i∈M
ri
qi
xi is the aggregate state, w1 =∑m
i=1 q
−1
i , and co is a constant. Moreover, for the jth DER,
the unconstrained power can be expressed as
dˆj(x) =
rj
qj
xj − β1
1 + β1w1
xa
qj
+ cj
=
1
qj
(
rjxj − β1
1 + β1w1
∑
i∈M
ri
qi
xi
)
+ cj ,
where cj is the jth component of co. If q−1i is not dimin-
ishing, we have as m→∞, w1 →∞. Hence, the jth DER
is only affected by the ith DER, ∀i 6= j, by a diminishing
factor of β11+β1w1
ri
qi
. This motivates us to approximate dˆ(x)
which couples over all the DERs’ state by a decoupled one,
given by,
d˜(x) := Λ−1Rx+ Q˜−1c˜, (18)
where Λ is diagonal. The diagonal matrix Λ will be chosen
such that  :=
∥∥∥Q˜−1 − Λ−1∥∥∥
2
is sufficiently small. The
following lemma gives a approximation matrix Λ and derives
its approximation error bound.
Lemma 4. Choose the approximation matrix Λ−1 as
Λ−1 = Q−1 − 1
2
β1w2
1 + β1w1
Im, (19)
where wj =
∑m
i=1 q
−j
i , for j = 1, 2. Then the approximation
error is
 ≤ 1
2
β1w2
1 + β1w1
.
Proof. Direct calculation yields∥∥∥Q˜−1 − Λ−1∥∥∥
2
=
β1
1 + β1w1
∥∥∥∥12w2Im − q−1q−T
∥∥∥∥
2
,
where we denote by q−1 the column vector [q−11 , ...q
−1
m ]
T
and by q−T its transpose. Notice that since q−1q−T is
a rank one matrix, it has eigenvalues {0, w2}. It follows
immediately that spectral radius of the symmetric matrix
1
2w2Im − q−1q−T is 12w2, and hence  ≤ 12 β1w21+β1w1 . This
completes the proof. 
Using Lemma 4, we can easily obtain an error bound
for the limiting case of an arbitrary number of DERs. The
following corollary also reveals that this error bound can be
arbitrarily small if all q′is are sufficiently large.
Corollary 1. Suppose q−1i is not diminishing. Then the
approximation error  is bounded by 12 maxi∈M q
−1
i .
Proof. If q−1i is not diminishing, then w1 →∞ as m→∞.
It follows from Lemma 4 that
 ≤ 1
2
β1w2
1 + β1w1
≤ 1
2
maxi∈M q−1i β1w1
1 + β1w1
,
and the right hand side of last inequality goes to
1
2 maxi∈M q
−1
i as m→∞. This completes the proof. 
It is worth mentioning that in practice, the coefficient
β1 will be relatively very small compare to qi, since it
denotes the quadratic cost of the total supply cost. Hence,
the constant 1 will dominate the denominator and the error
 will be very small even for a finite number of DERs.
Now the error bounds of using d˜(x) to approximate dˆ can
be easily obtained by
∥∥∥d˜(x)− dˆ(x)∥∥∥
2
≤  ‖x‖max ri after
applying the matrix induced norm inequality. Note that since
x ∈ (X−Ax)∩D is bounded, this error bound is diminishing
as → 0 if r′is are bounded.
Based on the above results, next we will approximate the
constrained maximizer d∗(x) in (13) using d˜(x) in (18). To
avoid the cluster of notation, let Ω(x) denote the projection
set (X − Ax) ∩ D. Intuitively, if  is small, we may
approximate d∗(x) by ProjΛΩ(x)d˜(x), that is, the projection
of d˜(x) onto Ω(x) in HΛ, where recall that d˜(x) is the
approximation of dˆ(x). This approximation can be justified
from the KKT conditions corresponding to the projection
d∗(x). Note that by definition,
d∗(x) = arg min
z∈Ω(x)
∥∥∥z − d˜(x)∥∥∥
Q˜
. (20)
The KKT conditions for the above minimization problem
can be found as,{
z = d˜(x)− Q˜−1LTµ,
Lz = b(x),
where Lz = b(x) are the active inequality constraints in
z ∈ Ω(x), and µ the associated Lagrangian multipliers. We
see that the optimal projection of d˜(x) is an affine function
of µ which depends explicitly on Q˜−1. Hence, we will use
the following quantity to approximate d∗(x),
d˜∗ := ProjΛΩ(x)d˜(x) = arg min
z∈Ω(x)
∥∥∥z − d˜(x)∥∥∥
Λ
. (21)
It is worth mentioning that explicit solutions of the optimal
primal and dual solutions z and µ of (20) can be obtained,
see for example [6]. A more thorough analysis based on these
explicit solutions will be our future work.
Now based on the approximation (21), we will prove
the following sufficient condition to guarantee the market
stability. The proof resembles that of the single DER case.
The main point is that the approximation d˜∗ is totally
decoupled among each DERs.
Theorem 2. Suppose ai ∈ (0, 1], qi > 0, ri ∈ R. The
closed-loop system (14) is exponentially stable if for all
i ∈M,
|ai + φiri| < 1, (22)
where φi is the ith diagonal element of Λ−1 in (19), given
by
φi = q
−1
i −
1
2
β1w2
1 + β1w1
,
and wj := β1
∑m
j=1 q
−j
j , for j = 1, 2.
Proof. We will prove that the mapping T (x) := Ax +
ProjΛΩ(x)d˜(x) is contractive.
First note that since Λ is diagonal and Ω(x) is hyper
rectangular in Rm, it can be easily shown by the definition
of the projection that ProjΛΩ(x)d˜(x) = ProjΩ(x)d˜(x). It then
follows from the same argument of Lemma 3 component-
wisely that
Ax+ ProjΩ(x)d˜(x) = ProjX
[
Ax+ ProjDd˜(x)
]
. (23)
Using (23) and the non-expansive property of the pro-
jection operation [4, Proposition 4.8], we have for arbitrary
x, y ∈ X , x 6= y,
‖T (x)− T (y)‖2 ≤
∥∥∥A(x− y) + ProjDd˜(x)− ProjDd˜(x)∥∥∥
2
.
Now consider the ith element of the vector inside the norm
on the right hand side of the above inequality. Similar to the
proof of Theorem 1, without loss of generality, we assume
xi > yi. If ri ≥ 0, we have by the non-expansiveness of the
projection that,
0 ≤ ai(xi − yi) + ProjDi d˜i(x)− ProjDi d˜i(y)
≤ (ai + φiri)(xi − yi), (24)
where d˜i(x) is the ith element of d˜(x) in (18).
If ri < 0, then∣∣∣ai(xi − yi) + ProjDi d˜(x)− ProjDi d˜(y)∣∣∣
≤ max
{
ProjDi d˜i(y)−ProjDi d˜i(x)+a(yi−xi), ai(xi−yi)
}
≤ max
{
d˜i(y)− d˜i(x) + a(yi − xi), ai(xi − yi)
}
= max {−ai − φiri, ai} (xi − yi), (25)
TABLE I: Parameters for Unstable Market Dynamics
Param. Value Param. Value
m = 1 m = 100 m = 1 m = 100
ai 0.95 U[0.95, 0.9] xi(0) U[xi, x¯i] U[xi, x¯i]
xri - U[350, 500] qi 0.005 0.005
xi 2500 x
r
i − 200 ri −0.1ai −2ai
x¯i 7500 xri + 200 ci 500 2x
r
i
di 0 0 β1 0.04 0.008
d¯i 500 U[100, 150] β2 20 20
Combining (24) and (25), we have
‖T (x)− T (y)‖2 ≤ ‖Ξ(x− y)‖2 ,
where Ξ is a diagonal matrix whose ith element is given by{
ai + φiri, if ri ≥ 0,
max {−ai − φiri, ai} , if ri < 0.
Then by the assumption (22),
‖T (x)− T (y)‖2 ≤ ‖Ξ‖2 ‖x− y‖2 < ‖x− y‖2 ,
which shows that T is a contraction mapping on X . Hence,
the closed-loop system is exponentially stable. Thus it com-
pletes the proof. 
We see from the above derived condition that if q−1i or ri
is sufficiently small, we can always guarantee the stability
of the closed-loop system (14). The small q−1i corresponds
to a bidding function with a relatively shallower slope.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we will present some examples to demon-
strate the application of the derived stability conditions. We
consider a scenario where the base price changes over time.
Note that the base price corresponds to the constant term β2
in the marginal cost λ = β1s+ β2, which can be influenced
by the external wholesale market price.
A. Single DER
We first consider the market consists of only one aggregate
DER. The columns below m = 1 in Table I give the simu-
lation parameters for the unstable market. In the simulation,
the base price β2 is set to {20, 40, 10, 30, 20} successively
every 20 market periods. The price and the aggregate power
evolution are depicted in Figs. 44a-4b, respectively. We can
see that the resulting market clearing prices and aggregate
power keep oscillating. Moreover, the base price as a coordi-
nating signal fails to adjust the aggregate power consumption
effectively. Note that in this case, we have q = 0.005 and the
ratio a+ rq+β1 = −1.1611, which violates the condition (17).
If we increase q to 0.2, then a + rq+β1 = 0.5542 and
the condition (17) is satisfied. The resulting market clearing
prices and aggregate power become stable in this case, as
can be seen from in Figs. 44c-4d.
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Fig. 4: Single DER market under base price change
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Fig. 5: Multi-DER market under base price change
B. Multiple DERs
We next assume that there are 100 DERs modeled by (1).
The parameters for the system dynamics, utility functions,
and the cost functions are generated randomly according to
the distribution/values in the m = 100 columns of Table I,
where U[h, l] denotes the uniform distribution within the
range [h, l], and the variable xri is used to generate several
other variables in the table. The same base price change
scenario in the single DER case is simulated where β2 is set
to {20, 40, 10, 30, 20} successively every 20 market periods.
We solve the social welfare problem (11) to obtain the market
clearing prices and energy allocation at each market period.
As shown in Figs. 55a-5b, both the market clearing prices
and the aggregate power are highly volatile and oscillating
with large amplitudes. In fact, the condition (22) are violated
for all DERs with ai + φiri ∈ (−190,−180). We next keep
the other parameters the same, and choose qi = 1.5 in order
to stabilize the market. With this new qi, the condition (22)
is satisfied for all DERs, where ai + φiri’s are around
−0.09. The resulted market clearing price and aggregate
demand evolution are illustrated in Figs. 55c-5d. We can
see that the market converges to an equilibrium very quickly
within 10 market periods. It is worth mentioning that one
could also change ri to stabilize the market following the
stability condition (22). Our extensive simulation shows that
condition (22) is a very efficient certification for the market
stability under multiple heterogeneous DERs.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper investigated the electricity market stability
under dynamic DER models. The individual DER was mod-
eled by a scalar linear system with both state and input
constraints. Under the assumption of quadratic utility and
cost functions, we characterized the competitive equilibrium
of the market, and convert the market stability into a discrete
nonlinear system stability problem. The stability analysis of
such systems is very challenging in general. We derived
analytical conditions to guarantee the system stability via a
contraction analysis approach. These conditions implied that
the market stability can be guaranteed by simply choosing
shallower slope or smaller coupling coefficient between
individual state and consumption. Numerical examples were
provided to demonstrate the application of the stability
results.
Our future work includes further investigation of less con-
servative conditions for the market stability and incorporating
the feeder capacity limits into the market model.
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